Blood in Pahalgam, Pressure on the Chenab
The brutal April 22 terror attack in Pahalgam, which left 25 Indian tourists and a local resident dead, marked a tipping point in the already brittle relationship between India and Pakistan. As evidence of Pakistani involvement in the attack began surfacing, India quickly shifted gears—not just diplomatically or militarily, but also hydrologically.
In a calibrated and symbolically loaded response, India moved to restrict water flow through the Baglihar Dam on the Chenab River, and signaled similar plans for the Kishanganga project on the Jhelum. While temporary and technically in line with treaty obligations, the move sent a powerful message: India is now prepared to weaponise water, long treated as off-limits under the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), as a pressure lever in the bilateral equation.
The Dam That Roared: Baglihar as Strategic Signal
Within days of the attack, Indian authorities began what was officially described as “de-silting operations” at the Baglihar Dam in Jammu and Kashmir’s Ramban district. The dam’s sluice gates were lowered, reducing downstream water flow to Pakistan by up to 90%. Technically, this is permissible under the IWT framework since Baglihar is a run-of-the-river hydroelectric project with minimal storage capacity. But the timing and scale of the operation left little room for ambiguity: this was no routine maintenance—it was a calculated geopolitical signal.
Although the Baglihar dam cannot indefinitely block water due to design constraints, India’s sudden operational shift highlights its willingness to revisit long-held positions of restraint. The short-term disruption was enough to remind Islamabad that geography is a persistent asymmetry, and upstream India holds levers of consequence.
Kishanganga in the Crosshairs
Next in line is the Kishanganga Dam, a 330 MW hydropower project in Bandipore, Jammu and Kashmir, which diverts water from a tributary of the Jhelum. Pakistani objections to the project date back years, arguing that it violates the IWT by altering natural river flows. While these claims were dismissed by a World Bank-appointed arbitration panel in India’s favour, the controversy has never quite died down.
India is now planning significant “maintenance activity” at Kishanganga, which could temporarily halt downstream flows. This again falls within permissible norms—no international rule prevents infrastructure maintenance—but given the context of retaliatory posturing after Pahalgam, Pakistan is reading it as escalation.
Indus Waters Treaty: A Pact Under Pressure
Signed in 1960 and brokered by the World Bank, the Indus Waters Treaty has been hailed as a rare example of peaceful cooperation between hostile neighbours. It allocates control of the eastern rivers (Ravi, Sutlej, Beas) to India and the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to Pakistan. While India is permitted non-consumptive uses like hydropower on the western rivers, it cannot store or divert their flow significantly.
Despite occasional flare-ups, India has largely honoured the treaty—even during war. But the scale and savagery of the Pahalgam attack has triggered a paradigm shift in New Delhi’s approach. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s response—marked by both grief and controlled fury—clearly framed the attack as an assault on the nation’s soul. Now, India’s tactical options are broadening beyond the battlefield and the diplomatic corridor.
Pakistan’s Reaction: Threats, but Limited Leverage
Pakistan’s response was swift and predictable: warnings that any disruption to water flow would be considered an act of war. It also hinted at suspending bilateral treaties like the Simla Agreement, which underpins the current Line of Control arrangement. Yet, Islamabad’s leverage in this arena is thin.
India’s water control infrastructure, although legally bound by treaty, provides natural upstream dominance. Unlike trade restrictions or diplomatic boycotts, water flow decisions are hard to challenge in international courts if made under the guise of technical necessity—especially when framed as maintenance or domestic optimisation.
Moreover, the world is increasingly tolerant of assertive national responses to terrorism. If New Delhi chooses to stretch the IWT’s interpretative limits in the wake of a terror strike, it is unlikely to face sustained global backlash, particularly when the victims were civilians and tourists.
Diplomatic Calculus: Binding Pakistan Without a Bullet
India’s current strategy reveals a sophisticated dual-front approach: it is isolating Pakistan diplomatically on the global stage while binding it strategically through geography and infrastructure. The recalibration of water flows isn’t about starving Pakistan overnight—it’s about signalling resolve, asserting sovereign prerogatives, and highlighting the cost of asymmetric warfare.
The fact that over 50 engineers from the National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC) have been deployed in Jammu and Kashmir to manage this pressure campaign suggests that this is not a knee-jerk reaction, but a carefully plotted policy trajectory.
At the same time, India continues to project technical compliance with treaty provisions, avoiding outright violations. This enables New Delhi to push Islamabad into a corner without triggering a direct breach of international law—effectively tightening a rope that is legal, strategic, and symbolic all at once.
A Thought for the Future
In the shadows of terror, India is crafting a new playbook—one that uses terrain, treaties, and timing with surgical precision. By leveraging the hydro-strategic upper hand, India is shifting the Indo-Pak equation from reactive deterrence to proactive pressure.
Water, once a symbol of peace, is becoming a lever of calculated assertion. If the Pahalgam attack was meant to unsettle India, the ripples it has set in motion may well drown Pakistan in its own miscalculations.
As New Delhi tightens control over its river systems, the message to Islamabad is clear: aggression has a price, and it can be exacted without a single shot fired—just one dam gate lowered at a time.
(With agency inputs)
