When Prime Minister Narendra Modi welcomed Russian President Vladimir Putin to New Delhi for their 2025 summit, the spotlight quickly shifted to a domain long central to the India–Russia partnership: civil nuclear energy. After reviewing progress at Kudankulam—India’s largest operational nuclear project—the two leaders advanced discussions on an even more consequential step: identifying and approving a second Russian-designed nuclear power plant site in India. In doing so, they signaled a shift from project-level cooperation to a broad, technology-diversified nuclear alliance aligned with India’s clean-energy pathway.
From Kudankulam’s Foundation to a Second Nuclear Hub
Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu forms the backbone of Indo-Russian nuclear collaboration. Two VVER-1000 reactors are already feeding the southern grid, while four additional units are at various stages of equipment delivery and contracting. At full strength, Kudankulam’s 6,000 MW will constitute a significant portion of India’s nuclear baseload by the late 2020s.
Riding on this momentum, both governments confirmed that discussions on a second multi-reactor installation have accelerated. The joint statement explicitly notes India’s intent to complete the formal allotment of a new site—an administrative step that essentially greenlights the next phase of nuclear expansion with Russian technology.
A Diversifying Technology Portfolio: VVER-1200s, SMRs, and Floating Reactors
What makes this summit notable is that cooperation is no longer confined to large light-water reactors. New areas now under negotiation include:
· A next-generation plant using VVER-1200 reactors, which offer higher output and advanced safety features, alongside plans for equipment localisation and joint fuel-assembly production in India.
· Small modular reactors (SMRs)—a domain both governments view as essential for distributed, modular clean-energy deployment.
· Russian floating nuclear power plants, discussed as potential solutions for remote regions and specialised applications such as desalination, medical isotope production, and agricultural processing.
This signals India’s intention to build out not just generation capacity, but a full ecosystem spanning the fuel cycle, lifecycle support, and non-power nuclear technologies.
How a Second Russian Plant Could Influence India’s 2030 Energy Mix
India’s nuclear capacity stands at roughly 7.5 GW, with a national goal of tripling this by 2030. Kudankulam alone—or at least units 3–6—will play a decisive role, contributing 4 GW of additional capacity by around 2027.
A second Russian plant could, in theory, add about 7.2 GW if built with six VVER-1200 units. Realistically, only one or two reactors could be commissioned by 2030, given the typical 8–10-year construction window. This would add approximately 1.2–2.4 GW to India’s 2030 fleet—meaning nuclear’s share of total generation would rise only modestly, perhaps by half a percentage point.
However, the significance lies less in the incremental 2030 arithmetic and more in system-level impacts. Additional firm, round-the-clock low-carbon capacity helps India integrate much higher levels of solar and wind into the grid, reducing dependence on coal for baseload stability. Furthermore, localisation of VVER-1200 components could lower costs and accelerate future domestic and foreign-vendor projects alike.
Small 2030 Gains, Major Long-Term Leverage
By itself, a second Russian-built nuclear station will not dramatically reshape India’s 2030 energy profile. What it will do is solidify nuclear power’s role as a central pillar of India’s long-term decarbonisation strategy. The Modi–Putin summit marks the point where cooperation broadened from one flagship project to a multi-site, multi-technology partnership—laying the institutional, industrial, and strategic foundations for the nuclear expansion India seeks through 2047 and beyond.
(With agency inputs)
