A New Chapter Opens in Moscow
In late October, a discreet but consequential development unfolded: senior figures from India’s top private defence companies travelled to Russia for rare, low-profile meetings on potential joint ventures. These engagements—unpublicised and sensitive—mark an inflection point in India’s defence industrial trajectory. They reveal New Delhi’s attempt to rejuvenate legacy Russian platforms through co-development while simultaneously cultivating Western technology partnerships that remain watchful, and often wary, of India’s deep ties with Moscow.
This quiet outreach illuminates a fundamental tension: India seeks strategic autonomy through multiple technology pipelines, yet each pipeline increasingly constrains the other.
Behind Closed Doors: Who Met Whom and Why It Matters
Executives from major firms—including large private conglomerates, defence manufacturers, and emerging players in drones and AI—participated in meetings in Moscow around 29–30 October. Although companies such as Adani Defence and Bharat Forge publicly distanced themselves from the trip, the very denials underscore the political and sanctions sensitivity surrounding such engagements.
The objective was clear: explore joint production of spares and components for frontline Russian-origin systems—MiG-29s, T-90s, T-72s, helicopters and air-defence platforms—many of which remain critical to India’s force structure. With Russia’s wartime supply chains stretched thin, Indian firms see an opportunity to localise production, stabilise logistics, and even create export lines under a “Make in India, supply globally” framework.
For New Delhi, these talks fit neatly into its vision of accelerating self-reliance while ensuring operational readiness across a military inventory that is still 36% Russian.
The Strategic Cost: How Russian JVs Complicate Western Technology Access
While the upside for industry is tangible, deeper Russian engagement carries significant geopolitical and technological trade-offs—most notably regarding Western technology transfer.
1. Sanctions Architecture Looms Large
Any formal collaboration with Russian defence entities risks triggering US secondary sanctions under CAATSA. India may have secured a waiver for its S-400 deal, but another major venture—especially in aerospace or advanced electronics—could spark a fresh round of scrutiny, chilling US export licences or slowing approvals for ongoing co-development programmes.
2. Fear of Technology Leakage
Washington and European capitals worry that cutting-edge technologies shared with India could indirectly reach Moscow. This has already shaped the GE F-414 engine transfer for the Tejas Mk2 and AMCA programmes—structured with tightly protected modules and limited visibility into core IP. European suppliers privately highlight that US reticence is often linked to India’s entrenched Russian ecosystem.
3. Interoperability and Trust Deficits
The dominance of Russian platforms in India’s arsenal creates interoperability hurdles for Western partners. With Russia’s defence industry increasingly reliant on Chinese components, concerns about supply-chain security and potential leakage compound the hesitations.
An Industrial Balancing Act with Long-Term Consequences
India is effectively running two parallel defence ecosystems: one anchored in Russian legacy platforms that need urgent sustenance, and another aligned with Western partners expected to fuel next-generation capabilities. The more India leans into new Russian joint ventures, the more difficult it becomes for Western suppliers to justify deeper technology sharing—especially in sensitive domains such as propulsion, stealth, and electronics.
How India structures these joint ventures—through ring-fencing, limited equity exposure, strict end-use controls and firewalling of supply chains—will determine whether they enhance resilience or constrain India’s long-term ambitions.
A Narrow Path to Strategic Autonomy
India’s quiet Moscow outreach reflects a pragmatic attempt to stabilise its defence supply chain amid wartime disruptions. Yet it also sharpens a long-standing dilemma: preserving Russian legacy platforms is essential for current capability, but expanding those ties risks slowing India’s access to transformative Western technologies.
The coming years will test whether India can craft a disciplined hybrid model—one in which Russian collaboration supports immediate readiness without jeopardising the deeper, high-value partnerships India seeks with the West. How effectively New Delhi navigates this tightrope will shape the future of its military modernisation and its broader geopolitical posture.
(With agency inputs)
